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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS





   v.
FAYETTE COUNTY, 
SHERIFF GARY BROWNFIELD, SR., individually and in his official capacity,
                                          Appellants in 02-2434
                                              
___________
DONALD WHITTAKER,
                                      Appellant in 02-2457
   v.
FAYETTE COUNTY, 
SHERIFF GARY BROWNFIELD, SR., individually and in his official capacity
                                              
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court Judge: The Honorable William L. Standish
(D.C. Civil No. 00-cv-01096)
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 6, 2003
Before: ROTH, BARRY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: April 9, 2003)
________________________
2OPINION OF THE COURT
________________________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Donald Whittaker brought an action against Fayette County and Sheriff Gary
Brownfield, Sr. (collectively, “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Whittaker claims that
his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by Brownfield’s politically-motivated
decision to terminate his employment.  Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Whittaker and awarded compensatory damages, but not punitive damages.  Defendants and
Whittaker filed post-trial motions seeking judgment as a matter of law and/or a new trial based
on asserted errors, which the District Court denied.  In their appeal from the District Court’s
denial of their post-trial motion, Defendants raise two issues: 1) whether the District Court
erred in admitting the testimony of another former employee and evidence concerning his
termination from the Sheriff’s Department; and 2) whether the record was sufficient to support
the jury verdict.  In his appeal from the District Court’s denial of his post-trial motion,
Whittaker raises an issue concerning an instruction the District Court gave with respect to
punitive damages.  We find that none of the arguments raised by Defendants and Whittaker have
any merit.  Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of their post-trial motions.
I.  BACKGROUND
The evidence presented at trial established that the incumbent Sheriff in Fayette County,
Norma Santore, announced in 1998 that she would not seek reelection in 1999.  (App. p. 91)
3Five candidates ran for the office in the Democratic primary, including Mark Santore (the
former Sheriff’s son) and Gary Brownfield, Sr.  Id. at 91-92.  Brownfield won the primary and
ran unopposed in the general election.  Id. 
Shortly after Brownfield won the primary, John Mongell asked him if he would “clean
house” after he took office.  Id. at 148.  Brownfield told Mongell that he would fire Whittaker,
a Deputy Sheriff, because he had observed Whittaker engaging in poor work behavior.  Id. at
148-149.  In a later conversation with Mongell, Brownfield again stated that he would fire
Whittaker because of his poor work habits, and added that he would also fire Mark Santore, the
incumbent Chief Deputy, because Santore’s mother (the former Sheriff) did not back
Brownfield in the election.  Id. at 150-151.
On January 3, 2000, Brownfield took office and fired Santore and Whittaker.  Id. at 33,
35, 93, 144.  Brownfield told Santore that he was being terminated because his “mother chose
this path for [him], that if she would have supported [Brownfield] instead of [Santore],
[Brownfield] would have kept [Santore] in the office.”  Id. at 144.  Brownfield told Whittaker
that he wanted “to surround [himself] with people [he] felt comfortable with,” and that he had
made “political promises.”  Id. at 36.  Brownfield said he “made some promises, campaign
promises to people, and he was going to keep them.”  Id. at 76-77.  Upon questioning by
Whittaker, Brownfield admitted that he was not firing him for the reasons he stated to Mongell.
Id. at 35.  
Brownfield replaced Santore with a political supporter, Larry Goldberg.  Id. at 96.
Goldberg had campaigned for Brownfield and had been promised the position of Chief Deputy
upon Brownfield’s election.  Id. at 97.  When Whittaker asked who Brownfield would hire to
4replace him, Brownfield said, “I don’t know . . . I have, like five people that I have talked to.
There are four or five people I’m looking at.”  Id. at 80.  Brownfield told Whittaker that “you
can be assured that if anyone asks me, I’ll tell them it [the firing] was for political reasons.”
Id. at 82.  Brownfield later hired Anthony Bartock and Lud Muccioli and four other individuals
for positions in the Sheriff’s Department, all of whom were campaign supporters of
Brownfield.  Id. at 104-105, 136-37.  Brownfield testified that none of these new hires filled
Whittaker’s position because that position had been eliminated.  (App. Vol. II, pp. 300-302,
409)  
Prior to trial, Defendants filed a motion in limine seeking the exclusion of the
testimony of Mark Santore.  Defendants argued that Santore’s testimony would be irrelevant
and highly prejudicial.  The District Court denied the motion and Santore was permitted to
testify.  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Whittaker and
awarded compensatory damages.  Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law at the
close of Whittaker’s case-in-chief and again following the conclusion of the evidence.  On
each occasion, the District Court denied the motion.  
The District Court then reconvened the jury to consider Whittaker’s claim for punitive
damages.  The District Court instructed the jury, in part, that punitive damages could be
awarded if “you find that the conduct of defendant Brownfield was shown to be motivated by
evil motive or intent, or if it involved reckless or callous indifference to the federally
protected rights of the plaintiffs.”  During their deliberations, the jury sent out the following
question: “Please define: reckless and callous.”  The District Court issued the following
instruction, over Whittaker’s objection: “Answer: The terms reckless and callous focus on the
5state of mind of a defendant.  They refer to a defendant’s knowledge that he may be acting in
violation of federal law, the conduct of the defendant despite that knowledge and the conscious
disregard or indifference of the defendant about the consequences of such conduct.”  (App.,
p. 178)  The jury awarded compensatory damages in the sum of $139,369, but did not award
punitive damages.  
Defendants filed a timely post-trial motion renewing their request for judgment as a
matter of law, and alternatively, requesting a new trial.  The District Court denied their motion.
Whittaker filed a motion for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages, which the District
Court also denied.  Defendants and Whittaker then filed timely notices of appeal to this Court.
II.  ANALYSIS
Because Whittaker brought his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the District Court had
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3),(4).  We have appellate jurisdiction
over the final judgments of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
A.  Admissibility of Santore Testimony
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.  Johnson v. Elk
Lake School District, 283 F.3d 138, 156 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).  “Where, however,
the district court fails to explain its grounds for denying [an evidentiary objection] and its
reasons for doing so are not otherwise apparent from the record, there is no way to review its
discretion. . . . In those circumstances, we need not defer to the district court’s ruling, and we
may undertake to examine the record and perform the required balancing ourselves.”  Becker
v. Arco Chemical Co., 207 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).  
6Defendants made a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Mark Santore on the
grounds that the evidence would be irrelevant and highly prejudicial.  Following oral argument,
the District Court denied the motion without explanation and ruled that it would allow
Santore’s testimony.  (App. Vol. II, p. 113)  Because the District Court did not explain its
reasoning in denying Defendants’ motion, we will examine the record and perform our own
analysis.  
Defendants argue that Santore’s testimony should have been excluded because it was
irrelevant and highly prejudicial.  Defendants assert that they are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law or a new trial because the admission of Santore’s testimony “improperly and
irreparably tainted the entire case since the jury was asked by plaintiff to conclude and in fact
concluded that Mr. Whittaker was terminated for political reasons because Santore was.”
(Def.’s Brief, p. 18)   
The first question is whether Santore’s testimony was relevant.  Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as that which tends “to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.”  In this case, Whittaker testified that Brownfield fired him
for political reasons, while Brownfield testified that he fired Whittaker because of his poor
work performance and because he wanted to reorganize the Sheriff’s Department.  The
conflicting testimony raised the consequential factual issue of Brownfield’s intent in firing
Whittaker.  Santore’s testimony was offered by Whittaker to prove that it was more probable
than not that Brownfield fired him for political reasons.  Accordingly, Santore’s testimony fits
within the Rule 401 definition of relevance.  
7Next, we must determine whether the evidence was otherwise admissible.  Santore’s
testimony pertained to an act by Brownfield other than the firing of Whittaker.  “Other act”
evidence falls under the rubric of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which provides that:
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident. . . .”  As we explained above, Santore’s testimony that
Brownfield fired him for political reasons was offered to prove that Brownfield was firing
Sheriff’s Department employees for political reasons.  In other words, the “other act” evidence
was offered to prove Brownfield’s motive or intent, and to rebut his asserted non-
discriminatory reasons for firing Whittaker.  See Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t., 174
F.3d 95, 110 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding, in the context of a Title VII action, that “evidence of
harassment of other women and widespread sexism is also probative of ‘whether one of the
principal nondiscriminatory reasons asserted by [an employer] for its actions was in fact a
pretext for ... discrimination.’”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1074 (2000); Burks v. Oklahoma Pub.
Co., 81 F.3d 975, 981 (10th Cir. 1996) ("As a general rule, the testimony of other employees
about their treatment by the defendant is relevant to the issue of the employer's discriminatory
intent."), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 931 (1996).
The proximity in time and similarity of circumstances between Brownfield’s firing of
Whittaker and Santore militate in favor of admission of the Santore testimony to prove
Brownfield’s motive or intent.  Whittaker and Santore were both Deputies in the Sheriff’s
Department.  Brownfield fired Whittaker and Santore on the same day.  He offered “politics”
8as a reason for both firings.  Both men were replaced by Brownfield’s campaign supporters.
These similarities warrant the admission of the “other act” evidence.  See Duckworth v. Ford,
83 F.3d 999, 1001-1002 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that, in civil rights action alleging defendant
had violated plaintiff’s first amendment rights by spreading rumors in retaliation for supporting
another candidate,  court did not err in admitting evidence about jury verdict in favor of a
different plaintiff against same defendant because of factual similarity between the cases).
The last remaining question with respect to the admissibility of the evidence is whether
the probative value of the Santore testimony is “substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. . .”  Fed. R. Evid. 403.  We
have already discussed the probative value of the Santore testimony.  Defendants contend that
the possible prejudice from this evidence is that it leads to an impermissible inference that
Whittaker was terminated for the same reasons as Santore.  Defendants also express concern
that Santore’s testimony “likely confused the issues and misled the jury.”  (Def.’s Brief, p. 23)
Defendants’ arguments with respect to prejudice and confusion, however, amount to an
assertion that Santore’s testimony tends to prove Whittaker’s case.  After all, the reason
Whittaker sought to admit Santore’s testimony was to prove that Brownfield intended to “clean
house” after his election to the office of Sheriff, and that included terminating employees who
did not support his candidacy.  The fact that relevant evidence is damaging to Defendants’ case
does not lead to the conclusion that it is unfairly prejudicial.  Accordingly, we find that the
Santore testimony need not have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 
B.  Sufficiency of the Evidence
     1Defendants contend that the standard of review should be plain error because Whittaker
did not submit a proposed instruction that was an accurate statement of the law.  Defendants
do not dispute, however, that Whittaker objected to the District Court’s proposed
9
“In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of
law, this Court applies the same standard as the district court.”  Starceski v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1095 (3d Cir. 1995).  “We review the record in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner, and affirm the denial unless  the record is ‘critically deficient
of that minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.’” Id.
We have reviewed the record and find that the District Court correctly denied
Defendants’ motion for a new trial on the ground of insufficient evidence.  There was evidence
that Brownfield terminated the employees who did not support him and hired campaign
supporters to fill the vacant positions.  There was evidence that Brownfield fired Whittaker
because he did not support Brownfield’s campaign for Sheriff.  Perhaps the most powerful
evidence on this point was Brownfield’s statement to Whittaker: “you can be assured that if
anyone asks me, I’ll tell them it [the firing] was for political reasons.”  (App., p. 219)
Brownfield does not deny that he made that statement.  The jury could reasonably infer from
the evidence that Brownfield was motivated to fire Whittaker because Whittaker did not
support his candidacy for Sheriff.  
C.  Punitive Damages Instruction
We review a district court’s jury instruction de novo when it is alleged that the
instruction misstated the law.  Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998).1    
instruction and that Whittaker submitted his own proposed instruction.  These actions were
sufficient to preserve this issue for review.  See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d
344, 350 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding jury instruction issue preserved by counsel’s
objection to a proposed instruction during charge conference).  
10
Whittaker asserts that the District Court erred in instructing the jury as to the definition
of “reckless and callous.”  Whittaker argues that the District Court’s instruction misled the
jury to believe that “punitive damages could only be awarded if the defendant acted with
knowledge that he was violating a civil right, or acted with such knowledge and indifference.”
(Whittaker’s Brief, p. 10)  Whittaker also maintains that the evidence supported an award of
punitive damages, and but for this erroneous instruction, the jury would have awarded them. 
The District Court instructed the jury, in part, that punitive damages could be awarded
if “you find that the conduct of defendant Brownfield was shown to be motivated by evil motive
or intent, or if it involved reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of
the plaintiffs.”  Both parties agree that this instruction was a correct statement of the law.  The
problem arose when the jury submitted a request for the District Court to define the terms
“reckless and callous.”  Over Whittaker’s objection, the District Court gave the following
instruction: “The terms reckless and callous focus on the state of mind of a defendant.  They
refer to a defendant’s knowledge that he may be acting in violation of federal law, the conduct
of the defendant despite that knowledge and the conscious disregard or indifference of the
defendant about the consequences of such conduct.”
The standard for punitive damages in a federal civil rights action has been established
by the Supreme Court: A jury may “assess punitive damages in [a civil rights action] when the
defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves
11
reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”  Smith v. Wade,
461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983); see also Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 430-431 (3d Cir. 2000).
This Court has explained that the term “reckless indifference” refers to the defendant’s
knowledge that he “may be acting in violation of federal law.”  Riga, 208 F.3d at 431 (citing
Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 537 (1999)); see also Miller v. Apartments
& Homes, 646 F.2d 101, 111 (3d Cir. 1981) (punitive damages appropriate where defendant
acts with reckless disregard as to whether he is violating a federally protected right, or
consciously and deliberately disregards consequences of actions).  Relying on Kolstad, this
Court found that the term “reckless” focuses on the defendant’s state of mind.  Riga, 208 F.3d
at 431.  In fact, the Supreme Court observed in Kolstad that the mere existence of a civil rights
violation is not a guarantee of eligibility for punitive damages because a defendant might not
be aware of the federal law he violated or he might have believed that the discrimination was
permissible.  527 U.S. at 536-537.    
We fail to see how the District Court’s definition of “reckless and callous” deviates in
any meaningful way from the definitions provided by the Supreme Court and this Court.
Because the District Court’s instruction was correct, we will affirm the District Court’s denial
of Whittaker’s motion for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s denial of Defendants’ and
Whittaker’s post-trial motions.  
12
/s/ Julio M. Fuentes            
Circuit Judge
